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NONZERO-SUM RISK-SENSITIVE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL
GAMES∗
MRINAL K. GHOSH † , K. SURESH KUMAR ‡ , AND CHANDAN PAL †
Abstract. We study two person nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with risk-sensitive
discounted and ergodic cost criteria. Under certain conditions we establish a Nash equilibrium in
Markov strategies for the discounted cost criterion and a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies
for the ergodic cost criterion. We achieve our results by studying the relevant systems of coupled
HJB equations.
Key words. Risk-sensitive criterion, controlled diffusion, Coupled HJB equations, Nash equi-
librium, Stationary strategy, Eventually stationary strategy.
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1. Introduction. We study nonzero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic differential
games on the infinite time horizon. In the literature of stochastic differential games,
one usually considers the expectation of the integral of costs [13], [15], [25] etc. This
is the so called risk-neutral situation where the players (i.e., the decision makers or
controllers) ignore the risk. If the players are risk-sensitive (i.e., risk-averse or risk-
seeking), then the most appropriate cost criterion is the expectation of the exponential
of the integral of costs. We refer to [23] for an excellent note on risk-sensitive Nash-
equilibria. Since the cost criterion is the expectation of the exponential of the integral
costs, it is multiplicative as opposed to the additive nature of the cost criterion in the
expectation of the integral costs case. Due to this, the analysis of the risk-sensitive
case is significantly different from its risk-neutral counterpart. To our knowledge, the
risk-sensitive criterion was first introduce by Bellman [5], see [27] and the reference
therein. Though this criterion has been studied extensively for stochastic optimal
control problems [8], [9], [10], [11], [17], [18], [19], [20], [22], [24], the corresponding
literature in the context of stochastic differential games is rather limited. Some ex-
ceptions are [3], [4], [14]. In this paper we address the existence of Nash equilibria for
stochastic differential games where the state of the system is governed by controlled
diffusion processes. We consider two risk-sensitive cost evaluation criteria: discounted
and ergodic. For both criteria, we establish Nash equilibria under certain conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the problem
description. The discounted cost criterion is analyzed in Section 3. Under certain
additive structural conditions on the drift vector and the cost functions we establish
the existence of a Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies. In Section 4 we study the
ergodic case. Under a Lyapunov type stability condition we establish the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies. Section 5 contains some concluding
remarks.
∗The work of the first named author is supported in part by UGC Centre for Advanced
Study. The work of the second named author is supported in part by the DST, India project
no. SR/S4/MS:751/12. The work of the third named author is supported in part by Dr. D. S.
Kothari postdoctoral fellowship of UGC.
†Department of Mathematics, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore-12, India.
(mkg@math.iisc.ernet.in, chandan14@math.iisc.ernet.in)
‡Department of Mathematics, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai-400076, India.
suresh@math.iitb.ac.in
1
2 MRINAL K. GHOSH, K. SURESH KUMAR AND CHANDAN PAL
2. Problem Description. For the sake of notational simplicity we treat two
player game. The N -player game for N ≥ 3 is analogous. Let Ui, i = 1, 2, be
compact metric spaces and Vi = P(Ui), the space of probability measures on Ui with
Prohorov topology. Let
b¯ = (b¯1, · · · , b¯d) : Rd × U1 × U2 → Rd,
r¯k : R
d × U1 × U2 → [0, ∞), k = 1, 2,
σ : Rd → Rd×d
be functions satisfying the following:
(A1) (i) The functions b¯, σ, r¯k, k = 1, 2, are bounded, Lipschitz continuous in the
first argument uniformly over the second and third arguments. Also the functions
b¯, r¯k, k = 1, 2, are (jointly) continuous.
(ii) The function a = σσ⊥ : Rd → Rd×d is uniformly elliptic, i.e., the infimum
of the eigenvalues of a is strictly positive. Here for a matrix say A, A⊥ denote the
transpose of A.
Define b = (b1, · · · , bd) : Rd × V1 × V2 → Rd, rk : Rd × V1 × V2 → [0, ∞) by
bi(x, v1, v2) =
∫
U2
∫
U1
b¯i(x, u1, u2)v1(du1)v2(du2),
rk(x, v1, v2) =
∫
U2
∫
U1
r¯k(x, u1, u2)v1(du1)v2(du2), x ∈ Rd,
v1 ∈ V1, v2 ∈ V2, i = 1, · · · , d, k = 1, 2.
Consider the following controlled diffusion process given by the solution of the stochas-
tic differential equation (s.d.e.)
(2.1) dX(t) = b(X(t), v1(t,X(t)), v2(t,X(t)))dt+ σ(X(t))dW (t),
where W (·) is an Rd-valued standard Wiener process, vi : [0,∞)× Rd → Vi, i = 1, 2
is a measurable function. Under (A1), the s.d.e. (2.1) has a unique weak solution
which is a strong Markov process for a given initial condition X(0) = x; see [[2],
Theorem 2.2.12, p.45] for details. For the stochastic differential game, the controlled
diffusion given by (2.1) has the following interpretation. The ith player controls the
state dynamics, i.e., the controlled diffusion given above, through the choice of his
strategy v¯i(t) = vi(t,X(t)), t ≥ 0. By an abuse of notation, the measurable map
vi : [0, ∞)×Rd → Vi itself is called a Markov strategy for player i. Let Mi = {vi :
[0, ∞) × Rd → Vi | vi is measurable} be the set of all Markov strategies for player
i. If vi doesn’t have explicit dependence on t, i.e., vi(t, x) = vi(x), x ∈ Rd, t ≥ 0,
it is said to be a stationary Markov strategy for player i. The set of all stationary
Markov strategies for player i is denoted by Si, i = 1, 2. We topologize Si, i = 1, 2,
using a metrizable weak* topology on L∞(Rd;Ms(Ui)), where Ms(Ui) denotes the
space of all signed measures on Ui with weak* topology. Since Si is a subset of the
unit ball of L∞(Rd;Ms(Ui)), it is compact under the above weak* topology. One also
has the following characterization of the topology given by the following convergence
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criterion:
For i = 1, 2, vni → vi in Si as n→∞ if and only if
(2.2) lim
n→∞
∫
Rd
f(x)
∫
Ui
g(x, ui)v
n
i (x)(dui)dx =
∫
Rd
f(x)
∫
Ui
g(x, ui)vi(x)(dui)dx,
for all f ∈ L1(Rd) ∩ L2(Rd), g ∈ Cb(Rd × Ui); see [[2], p.57] for details.
Now we define a class of strategies to be referred to as eventually stationary
strategies denoted by Sˆi, i = 1, 2. Let Θ > 0. Let
Sˆi = {vˆi : (0,Θ)× Rd → Vi | vˆi is measurable}, i = 1, 2.
We consider the weak* topology L∞((0,Θ)×Ms(Ui)), on the space Sˆi, introduced by
Warga [26] for the topology of relaxed controls. Note that with the above topology,
Sˆi becomes a compact metrizable space with following convergence criterion:
For i = 1, 2, vˆni → vˆi in Sˆi as n→∞ if and only if
lim
n→∞
∫
(0,Θ)
∫
Rd
f(θ, x)
∫
Ui
g(θ, x, ui)vˆ
n
i (θ, x)(dui)dxdθ(2.3)
=
∫
(0,Θ)
∫
Rd
f(θ, x)
∫
Ui
g(θ, x, ui)vˆi(θ, x)(dui)dxdθ,
for all f ∈ L1((0,Θ)× Rd) ∩ L2((0,Θ)× Rd), g ∈ Cb((0,Θ)× Rd × Ui). The Markov
strategies associated with vˆi ∈ Sˆi, i = 1, 2, is given by vˆi(θe−αt, X(t)), t ≥ 0, for each
θ ∈ (0,Θ) and α > 0, where X(t) is the solution of the s.d.e.
dX(t) = b(X(t), vˆ1(θe
−αt, X(t)), vˆ2(θe
−αt, X(t)))dt+ σ(X(t))dW (t).
By an abuse of notation, we represent the eventually stationary Markov strategies by
elements of Sˆi, though each member in Sˆi corresponds to a family of Markov strategies
indexed by θ and α. Note that as t→∞, e−αt → 0. Thus in the long run an element
of Sˆi “eventually” becomes an element of Si for a fixed θ. Hence the terminology.
We consider two risk-sensitive cost criteria, discounted cost and ergodic cost cri-
teria which we describe now.
2.1. Discounted cost criterion. Let θ ∈ (0, Θ) be the risk-aversion parameter.
In the α-discounted payoff criterion, ith player chooses his strategy vi from the set of
all Markov strategies Mi to minimize his risk-sensitive cost given by
(2.4) J v1,v2α,i (θ, x) :=
1
θ
logEv1,v2x
[
eθ
∫
∞
0
e−αtri(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v2(t,X(t))dt
]
, x ∈ Rd,
where α > 0 is the discount parameter, X(t) is the solution of the s.d.e. (2.1)
corresponding to (v1, v2) ∈ M1×M2 and Ev1,v2x denote the expectation with respect
to the law of the process (2.1) corresponding to the Markov strategy pair (v1, v2) with
the initial condition X(0) = x.
Definition 2.1. A pair of strategies (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ M1 ×M2 is said to be a Nash
equilibrium among Markov strategies if
J v∗1 ,v∗2α,1 (θ, x) ≤ J v1,v
∗
2
α,1 (θ, x), ∀ v1 ∈M1, x ∈ Rd,
J v∗1 ,v∗2α,2 (θ, x) ≤ J v
∗
1 ,v2
α,2 (θ, x), ∀ v2 ∈M2, x ∈ Rd.
Our main result for discounted risk-sensitive game is establishing the existence of a
Nash equilibrium among the class of eventually stationary strategies.
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2.2. Ergodic cost criterion. In this criterion player i chooses his strategy
vi ∈Mi so as to minimize his risk-sensitive accumulated cost given by
(2.5) ρv1,v2i (θ, x) = lim sup
T→∞
1
θT
logEv1,v2x
[
eθ
∫
T
0
ri(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v2(t,X(t))dt
]
, x ∈ Rd.
The definition of Nash equilibrium is analogous. We wish to establish the existence
of a Nash equilibrium among the class of stationary strategies.
For both cost criteria, we carry out analysis by studying the corresponding system
of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. Note that if one of the players,
say player 1, is using a prescribed stationary strategy, then it is a (stochastic) optimal
control problem for the other player (player 2) which has been studied in [10], [11].
The value function of this stochastic optimal control problem is the unique solution
of the corresponding HJB equation. Then a stationary/Markov strategy associated
with a minimizing selector of the appropriate Hamiltonian of the HJB equation yields
an optimal control of the second player. Thus this stationary/Markov strategy is an
optimal response of player 2 given that player 1 is employing a prescribed strategy.
Therefore for a given pair of stationary/Markov strategies, we obtain a pair of optimal
responses of the players via the corresponding HJB equations. Any fixed point of this
map gives a Nash equilibrium. This leads us to study a coupled system of HJB
equations for each criterion which we describe in forthcoming sections. To this end
we first set up the frequently used notations.
Denote sup
v1,v2,x
|ri(x, v1, v2)| by ‖ri‖∞, i = 1, 2. In general, for ϕ ∈ Cb(Rd), the
space of all bounded, continuous functions, we denote for each B, a Borel subset of
R
d,
‖ϕ‖∞,B = sup
x∈B
|ϕ(x)|, ‖ϕ‖∞ = sup
x∈Rd
|ϕ(x)|.
We define the weighted Sobolev spaces W 2,p,λ(Rd), 1 ≤ p <∞, λ > 0 as follows:
W 2,p,λ(Rd) = {ϕ : Rd → R|ϕ is measurable and ϕe(λ), ∂ϕ
∂xi
e(λ),
∂2ϕ
∂xi∂xj
e(λ) ∈ Lp(Rd), i, j = 1, · · · , d},
where
e(λ)(x) = e−λ
√
1+‖x‖2 , x ∈ Rd.
The W 2,p,λ-norm is defined as
‖ϕ‖p2,p,λ =
∫
|ϕ(x)|pe(λ)(x)dx+
∑
i
∫ ∣∣∣∂ϕ(x)
∂xi
∣∣∣pe(λ)(x)dx+∑
i,j
∫ ∣∣∣∂2ϕ(x)
∂xixj
∣∣∣pe(λ)(x)|dx.
For a Banach space X with norm ‖ · ‖X , 1 ≤ p <∞, define
Lp(t0, T ;X ) = {ϕ : (t0, T )→ X|ϕ is Borel measurable and
∫ T
t0
‖ϕ(t)‖pX dt <∞}
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with the norm
‖ϕ‖p;X =
[ ∫ T
t0
‖ϕ(t)‖pX dt
] 1
p
.
The space W1,2,p((t0, T )×Rd)), t0 ≥ 0, denotes the set of all ϕ ∈ Lp(t0, T ;W 2,p(Rd))
such that ∂ϕ
∂t
∈ Lp((t0, T ;Lp(Rd)) with the norm given by
‖ϕ‖p
1,2,p;W 2,p(Rd)
= ‖ϕ‖p
p;W 2,p(Rd)
+ ‖∂ϕ
∂t
‖p
p;Lp(Rd)
, 1 ≤ p <∞.
The corresponding weighted Sobolev spaces are defined by
W1,2,p,λ((t0, T )× Rd)) = {ϕ ∈ Lp(t0, T ;W 2,p,λ(Rd)|∂ϕ
∂t
∈ Lp(t0, T ;Lp,λ(Rd)}
with the norm given by
‖ϕ‖p
1,2,p,λ;W 2,p(Rd)
= ‖ϕ‖p
p,;W 2,p,λ(Rd)
+ ‖∂ϕ
∂t
‖p
p;Lp,λ(Rd)
, 1 ≤ p <∞.
It is easy to see that the above ‘regular’ parabolic weighted Sobolev spaces can be iso-
metrically identified with the ‘usual’ space-time weighted Sobolev spacesW 1,2,p,λ((t0, T )×
R
d) defined by
W 1,2,p,λ((t0, T )× Rd) = {ϕ : (t0, T )× Rd → R|ϕ is measurable and ϕe(λ), ∂ϕ
∂xi
e(λ),
∂ϕ
∂t
e(λ),
∂2ϕ
∂xi∂xj
e(λ) ∈ Lp((t0, T )× Rd), i, j = 1, · · · , d}
with norm
‖ϕ‖p1,2,p,λ =
∫ ∫
|ϕ(t, x)|pe(λ)(x)dxdt +
∫ ∫ ∣∣∣∂ϕ(t, x)
∂t
∣∣∣pe(λ)dxdt
+
∑
i
∫ ∫ ∣∣∣∂ϕ(t, x)
∂xi
∣∣∣pe(λ)(x)dxdt +∑
ij
∫ ∫ ∣∣∣∂2ϕ(t, x)
∂xixj
∣∣∣pe(λ)(x)|dxdt.
Also the local Sobolev spaces W 1,2,p((t0, T )× Rd) are defined by
W
1,2,p
loc (t0, T )×Rd) = {ϕ : (t0, T )×Rd → R|ϕ is measurable and ϕ ∈W 1,2,p((t0, T )×BR), R > 0}.
The norm ‖ · ‖1,2,p;(t0,T )×BR is defined as
‖ϕ‖p1,2,p;(t0,T )×BR =
∫ T
t0
∫
BR
|ϕ(t, x)|pdxdt+
∫ T
t0
∫
BR
∣∣∣∂ϕ(t, x)
∂t
∣∣∣pdxdt
+
∑
i
∫ T
t0
∫
BR
∣∣∣∂ϕ(t, x)
∂xi
∣∣∣pdxdt+∑
ij
∫ T
t0
∫
BR
∣∣∣∂2ϕ(t, x)
∂xixj
∣∣∣p|dxdt,
where BR denotes the open ball of radius R with center 0 in R
d.
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3. Analysis of Discounted Cost Criterion. In this section, we consider the
discounted cost criterion for the stochastic differential game. We carry out our analysis
for the α-discounted cost criterion via the criterion
(3.1) Jv1,v2α,i (θ, x) := E
v1,v2
x
[
eθ
∫
∞
0
e−αtri(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v2(t,X(t))dt
]
.
Since logarithm is an increasing function, therefore any Nash equilibrium for the
criterion (2.4) is a Nash equilibrium for the above criterion. The definition of Nash
equilibrium is analogous for the above criterion.
Let vˆi ∈ Sˆi, i = 1, 2. Corresponding to the cost criterion (3.1), the value functions
are defined by
ψvˆ2α,1(θ, x) = inf
v˜1∈M1
J
v˜1,vˆ2
α,1 (θ, x)
= inf
v˜1∈M1
Ev˜1,vˆ2x
[
eθ
∫
∞
0
e−αtri(X(t),v˜1(t,X(t)),vˆ2(θe
−αt,X(t))dt
]
,
ψvˆ1α,2(θ, x) = inf
v˜2∈M2
J
vˆ1,v˜2
α,2 (θ, x)
= inf
v˜2∈M2
Evˆ1,v˜2x
[
eθ
∫∞
0
e−αtri(X(t),vˆ1(θe
−αt,X(t)),v˜2(t,X(t))dt
]
, θ ∈ (0, Θ), x ∈ Rd.
Now we prove that the above value functions are solutions of the corresponding HJB
equations for discounted cost criterion. For a (heuristic) derivation of these HJB
equations using multiplicative dynamic programming, we refer to [20]. We first prove
the following.
Lemma 3.1. Assume (A1). Then for vˆ1 ∈ Sˆ1 and for each κ ∈ (0, Θ), the p.d.e.
αθ
∂ψκ
∂θ
= inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2),∇xψκ〉+ θr2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2)ψκ
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψκ),(3.2)
ψκ(κ, x) = e
κ‖r2‖∞
α , θ ∈ (κ, Θ), x ∈ Rd,
has a unique solution in
⋂
p≥d+1,λ>0W
1,2,p,λ((κ,Θ)× Rd) given by
ψκ(θ, x) = inf
v2∈M2
Evˆ1,v2x
[
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α eθ
∫
Tκ
0
e−αtr2(X(t),vˆ1(θe
−αt,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
]
,
where Tκ =
log( θ
κ
)
α
.
Similarly, for vˆ2 ∈ Sˆ2, the p.d.e.
αθ
∂φκ
∂θ
= inf
v1∈V1
[
〈b(x, v1, vˆ2(θ, x)),∇xφκ〉+ θr1(x, v1, vˆ2(θ, x))φκ
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xφκ),(3.3)
φκ(κ, x) = e
κ‖r1‖∞
α , θ ∈ (κ, Θ), x ∈ Rd,
has a unique solution in
⋂
p≥d+1,λ>0W
1,2,p,λ((κ,Θ)× Rd) given by
φκ(θ, x) = inf
v1∈M1
Ev1,vˆ2x
[
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α eθ
∫
Tκ
0
e−αtr1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),vˆ2(θe
−αt,X(t)))dt
]
.
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Proof. From [[7], Theorem 3.3, p.235-236], it follows that (3.2) has a unique
solution in W1,2,p,λ((κ,Θ)×Rd), p ≥ 2, λ > 0. Since W1,2,p((κ,Θ)× Rd) is isometric
to W 1,2,p,λ((κ,Θ) × Rd), it follows that the p.d.e. (3.2) has a unique solution in⋂
p≥2,λ>0W
1,2,p,λ((κ,Θ)× Rd).
Fix p ≥ d+ 1 and λ > 0. Choose a sequence ψn ∈ C∞0 ((κ,Θ)×Rd), the space of
all C∞((κ,Θ)×Rd) functions which are compactly supported, such that ψn → ψκ in
W 1,2,p,λ((κ,Θ)× Rd).
Now using Itoˆ-Dynkin formula to ψn (θ(t), X(t)), t ≥ 0, where θ(t) = θe−αt and
X(t) is the process (2.1) corresponding to the Markov strategy pair (vˆ1, v2), v2 ∈M2
with the initial condition X(0) = x, , we obtain
ψn(θ, x) = Evˆ1,v2x
[
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α eθ
∫ Tκ∧τR
0 e
−αsr2(X(s),vˆ1(θ(s),X(s)),v2(s,X(s)))ds
]
−Evˆ1,v2x
[ ∫ Tκ∧τR
0
eθ
∫
t
0
e−αsr2(X(s),vˆ1(θ(s),X(s)),v2(s,X(s)))ds
[
− αθ(t)∂ψ
n(θ(t), X(t))
∂θ
+〈b(X(t), vˆ1(θ(t), X(t)), v2(t,X(t))),∇xψn(θ(t), X(t))〉
+θ(t)r2(X(t), vˆ1(θ(t), X(t)), v2(t,X(t)))ψ
n(θ(t), X(t))
+
1
2
trace(a(X(t))∇2xψn(θ(t), X(t)))
]
dt
]
,
where
τR = inf{t ≥ 0|‖X(t)‖ > R}, R > 0.
Now by letting n→∞, we obtain
ψκ(θ, x) = E
vˆ1,v2
x
[
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α eθ
∫ Tκ∧τR
0 e
−αsr2(X(s),vˆ1(θ(s),X(s)),v2(s,X(s)))ds
]
−Ev1,v2x
[ ∫ Tκ∧τR
0
eθ
∫
t
0
e−αsr2(X(s),vˆ1(θ(s),X(s)),v2(s,X(s)))ds
[
− αθ(t)∂ψκ(θ(t), X(t))
∂θ
+〈b(X(t), vˆ1(θ(t), X(t)), v2(t,X(t))),∇xψκ(θ(t), X(t))〉
+θ(t)r2(X(t), vˆ1(θ(t), X(t)), v2(t,X(t)))ψ
n(θ(t), X(t))
+
1
2
trace(a(X(t))∇2xψκ(θ(t), X(t)))
]
dt
]
.
Hence it follows that
ψκ(θ, x) ≤ Evˆ1,v2x
[
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α eθ
∫ Tκ∧τR
0 e
−αsr2(X(t),vˆ1(θ(t),X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
]
, ∀ v2 ∈M2.
Now by invoking dominated convergence theorem for letting R→∞ above, we obtain
ψκ(θ, x) ≤ Evˆ1,v2x
[
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α eθ
∫
Tκ
0
e−αsr2(X(t),vˆ1(θ(t),X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
]
, ∀ v2 ∈ M2.
Let vˆ∗2(θ, x) denote a (measurable) minimizing selector in
inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2),∇xψκ(θ, x)〉 + θr2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2)ψκ(θ, x)
]
.
8 MRINAL K. GHOSH, K. SURESH KUMAR AND CHANDAN PAL
That is
inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2),∇xψκ(θ, x)〉 + θr2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2)ψκ(θ, x)
]
= 〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), vˆ∗2(θ, x)),∇xψκ(θ, x)〉 + θr2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), vˆ∗2(θ, x))ψκ(θ, x).
The existence of such a vˆ∗2(θ, x) is ensured by [6]. Repeating the above argument
replacing v2 with vˆ
∗
2 ∈ Sˆ2, we obtain
ψκ(θ, x) = E
vˆ1,vˆ
∗
2
x
[
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α eθ
∫
Tκ
0
e−αsr2(X(t),vˆ1(θ(t),X(t)),vˆ
∗
2(θ(t),X(t)))dt
]
.
Thus
(3.4) ψκ(θ, x) = inf
v2∈M2
Evˆ1,v2x
[
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α eθ
∫
Tκ
0
e−αsr2(X(t),vˆ1(θ(t),X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
]
.
This completes the proof of the first part. The proof of the second part follows by a
symmetric argument.
Next we take limit κ → 0 and show that value function satisfies the limiting
equation. In particular we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Assume (A1). (i) For each vˆ1 ∈ Sˆ1, the p.d.e.
αθ
∂ψ
∂θ
= inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2),∇xψ〉+ θr2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2)ψ
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ),(3.5)
ψ(0, x) = 1, θ ∈ (0, Θ), x ∈ Rd
has a unique solution in
⋂
p≥d+1W
1,2,p
loc ((0, Θ)× Rd) ∩ Cb((0, Θ)× Rd) given by
inf
v2∈M2
Ev1,v2x
[
eθ
∫
Tκ
0
e−αtr2(X(t),vˆ1(θe
−αt,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
]
:= ψv1α,2(θ, x).
(ii) Similarly, for each vˆ2 ∈ Sˆ2, the p.d.e.
αθ
∂φ
∂θ
= inf
v1∈V1
[
〈b(x, v1, vˆ2(θ, x)),∇xφ〉+ θr1(x, v1, vˆ2(θ, x))φ
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xφ),(3.6)
φ(0, x) = 1, θ ∈ (0, Θ), x ∈ Rd
has a unique solution in
⋂
p≥d+1W
1,2,p
loc ((0, Θ)× Rd) ∩ Cb((0, Θ)× Rd) given by
inf
v1∈M1
Ev1,v2x
[
eθ
∫
Tκ
0
e−αtr1(X(t),vˆ1(θe
−αt,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
]
:= ψv2α,1(θ, x).
Proof. We prove (i). The proof of (ii) is analogous. From Lemma 3.1, it follows
that (3.2) has a unique solution inW 1,2,p,λ((κ,Θ)×Rd)∩Cb((κ, Θ)×Rd), p ≥ 2, λ > 0
and is given by
(3.7) ψκ(θ, x) = inf
v2∈M2
Ev1,v2x
[
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α eθ
∫
Tκ
0
e−αtr2(X(t),vˆ1(θe
−αt,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
]
.
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From (3.7), it follows that
(3.8) ‖ψκ‖∞ ≤ e
θ‖r2‖∞
α .
Using similar arguments as in the proof of [[11], Theorem 3.1], it follows that
(3.9) ‖∂ψκ
∂θ
‖∞ ≤ 3e
(θ+2)‖r2‖∞
α
‖r2‖∞
α
.
For λ > 0 fixed, rewrite (3.2) as follows.
(3.10) λψκ = inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2),∇xψκ〉+ rκ(θ, x, v2)
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψκ),
where
rκ(θ, x, v2) = θr2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2)ψκ(θ, x) − αθ∂ψκ
∂θ
+ λψκ(θ, x).
Choose λ ≥ λ0 > 0 is such that rk ≥ 0. From [[7], Lemma 1.5, p.209], for λ >
0 large enough, say λ ≥ λ1 for some large λ1 ≥ λ0, for each θ > κ, ψκ(θ, ·) ∈⋂
p≥2,λ>λ1
W 2,p,λ(Rd) ∩ Cb(Rd) is the unique solution to (3.10). Let vˆ2(θ, x) be a
minimizing selector in (3.10). Then (3.10) can be rewritten as
〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), vˆ2(θ, x)),∇xψκ〉+ 1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψκ) = λψκ − rk(x, vˆ2(θ, x)).
The r.h.s. of the above p.d.e. is uniformly bounded in κ > 0. Hence by using similar
arguments as in [[12], p.158], it follows that
(3.11) ‖ψκ(θ, ·)‖2,p;BR ≤ K,
where the constant K > 0 is independent of κ > 0, θ ∈ (0, Θ).
Define ψ¯κ as follows.
ψ¯κ(θ, x) =
{
ψκ(θ, x) if θ > κ
e
κ‖r2‖∞
α if θ ≤ κ.
One can see that ψ¯κ ∈ W 1,2,p((0,Θ)× BR) for all p ≥ 2, R > 0. Also from (3.9) and
(3.11), it follows that
(3.12) sup
κ>0
‖ψ¯κ‖1,2,p;BR <∞, R > 0.
Note that W 1,2,p((0,Θ) × BR) is a reflexive Banach space. Hence using Banach-
Alaoglu theorem, it follows that {ψκ|κ > 0} is weakly compact in W 1,2,p((0, Θ) ×
BR), R > 0. Hence by a diagonalization procedure, there exists ψ ∈ W 1,2,ploc ((0,Θ)×
R
d) and a sequence, say ψκn , such that ψκn → ψ weakly inW 1,2,p,λ((0,Θ)×BR), R >
0. Now by a standard approximation argument, by letting κn → 0 in (3.2), it follows
that ψ ∈W 1,2,ploc ((0,Θ)× Rd) is a solution in the sense of distributions to
αθ
∂ψ
∂θ
= inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2),∇xψ〉+ θr2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2)ψ
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ).
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Moreover ψ(0, x) = 1. Hence ψ ∈ W 1,2,ploc ((0,Θ)× Rd) is a solution to (3.5).
For p ≥ d+ 1, using Itoˆ’s formula as in the proof of Lemma 3.1, it follows that
ψ(θ, x) = inf
v2∈M2
Ev1,v2x
[
eθ
∫
∞
0
e−αtr2(X(t),vˆ1(θe
−αt,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
]
(:= ψvˆ1α,2(θ, x)).
Hence ψ ∈ ⋂p≥d+1W 1,2,ploc ((0,Θ) × Rd) ∩ Cb((0, Θ) × Rd) is the unique solution to
(3.5).
To continue our analysis we prove some estimates needed later.
Lemma 3.3. Assume (A1). (i) For θ ∈ (0,Θ) and α > 0 and vˆi ∈ Sˆi, i = 1, 2, we
have
1 ≤ max{ψvˆ2α,1(θ, x), ψvˆ1α,2(θ, x)} ≤ max
i
e
θ‖ri‖∞
α ,(3.13)
max{‖∂ψ
vˆ2
α,1
∂θ
‖∞, ‖
∂ψvˆ1α,2
∂θ
‖∞} ≤ max
i
‖ri‖∞
α
e
Θ‖ri‖∞
α .
(ii) For each R > 0, and vˆi ∈ Sˆi, i = 1, 2, we have
(3.14) sup
vˆ1∈Sˆ1
‖ψvˆ1α,2‖1,2,p;(0,Θ)×BR <∞, sup
vˆ2∈Sˆ2
‖ψvˆ2α,1‖1,2,p;(0,Θ)×BR <∞.
Proof. The proof of (i) follows as in [[11], Theorem 3.1].
Let v˜2(θ, x) be a minimizing selector in (3.5). Then (3.5) can be rewritten as
〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v˜2(θ, x)),∇xψvˆ1α,2〉+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψvˆ1α,2)
= αθ
∂ψvˆ1α,2
∂θ
− θr2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v˜2(θ, x))ψvˆ1α,2.
From (i), it follows that r.h.s. above is uniformly bounded in θ ∈ (0,Θ), vˆ1 ∈ Sˆ1.
Hence using arguments as in [[12], p.158], it follows that
(3.15) sup
θ,vˆ1
‖ψvˆ1α,2‖2,p;BR <∞.
Hence (ii) follows.
Lemma 3.4. Assume (A1). The maps vˆ1 7→ ψvˆ1α,2 from Sˆ1 → C0,1((0,Θ) × Rd)
and vˆ2 7→ ψvˆ2α,1 from Sˆ2 → C0,1((0,Θ)× Rd) are continuous.
Proof. Let vˆm1 → vˆ1 in Sˆ1. Then using Lemma 3.3 (ii), we have for each R > 0,
(3.16) sup
m≥1
‖ψvˆm1α,2‖1,2,p;(0,Θ)×BR <∞.
Now by compact embedding theorem [see [1], Chapter 6], Banach-Alaoglu theorem,
and a standard diagonalization argument, there exist ψ ∈ W 1,2,ploc ((0,Θ) × Rd) ∩
C0,1((0, Θ)× Rd) such that along a subsequence
(3.17) ψ
vˆm1
α,2 → ψ in C0,1((0,Θ)×BR), R > 0.
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For ϕ ∈ C∞0 ((0,Θ)× Rd), from (3.5) we have
∫ Θ
0
∫
Rd
αθ
∂ψ
vˆm1
α,2
∂θ
ϕdθdx
=
∫ Θ
0
∫
Rd
inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, vˆm1 (θ, x), v2),∇xψvˆ
m
1
α,2〉+ θr2(x, vˆm1 (θ, x), v2)ψvˆ
m
1
α,2
]
ϕdθdx
+
1
2
∫ Θ
0
∫
Rd
trace(a(x)∇2xψvˆ
m
1
α,2)ϕdθdx.
Now using appropriate integration by parts formulae for the second term on the
r.h.s. and the term on the l.h.s above and then using (3.17), it follows that ψ is a
solution in the sense of distribution to (3.5). Since ψ(0, x) = 1, it is a solution in⋂
p≥d+1W
1,2,p
loc (0,Θ)× Rd) ∩ Cb((0,Θ) × Rd) of the p.d.e. (3.5). Hence by Theorem
3.2, it follows that ψ = ψvˆ1α,1. This proves the continuity of the first map. The proof
of the continuity of the second map follows by a symmetric argument.
For (vˆ1, vˆ2) ∈ Sˆ1 × Sˆ2, define
(3.18) H(vˆ1, vˆ2) = H1(vˆ2)×H2(vˆ1),
where
H1(vˆ2) =
{
vˆ∗1 ∈ Sˆ1|F1(x, vˆ∗1(θ, x), vˆ2(θ, x)) = inf
v1∈V1
F1(x, v1, vˆ2(θ, x)) a.e. θ, x
}
,
F1(x, v1, vˆ2(θ, x)) = 〈b(x, v1, vˆ2(θ, x)),∇xψvˆ2α,1〉+ θr1(x, v1, vˆ2(θ, x)),
θ, x ∈ (0,Θ)× Rd, v1 ∈ V1, vˆ2 ∈ Sˆ2,
H2(vˆ1) =
{
vˆ∗2 ∈ Sˆ2|F2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), vˆ∗2(θ, x)) = inf
v2∈V2
F1(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2) a.e. θ, x
}
,
F2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2) = 〈b(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2),∇xψvˆ1α,2〉+ θr2(x, vˆ1(θ, x), v2),
θ, x ∈ (0,Θ)× Rd, v2 ∈ V2, vˆ1 ∈ Sˆ1,
Using linear structure of Fi and the compactness of Sˆi, i = 1, 2, it is easy to see
that H(vˆ1, vˆ2) is nonempty, convex and compact subset of Sˆ1 × Sˆ2.
To prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, we prove the upper semi-continuity
(u.s.c.) of the map (vˆ1, vˆ2) 7→ H(vˆ1, vˆ2) from Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 → 2Sˆ1 × 2Sˆ2 . To establish the
u.s.c. we need some additive structure on the drift of the state dynamics and the cost
function (ADAC) given as follows.
(A2) We assume that b¯ : Rd×U1×U2 → Rd and r¯i : Rd×U1×U2 → [0, ∞), i = 1, 2
take the additive structure given by
b¯(x, u1, u2) = b¯1(x, u1) + b¯2(x, u2),
r¯i(x, u1, u2) = r¯i1(x, u1) + r¯i2(x, u2), x ∈ Rd, u1 ∈ U1, u2 ∈ U2, i = 1, 2.
The conditions in (A1)(i) are assumed for b¯i, r¯i1, r¯i2, i = 1, 2.
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Lemma 3.5. Assume (A1) and (A2). Then the map (vˆ1, vˆ2) 7→ H(vˆ1, vˆ2) from
Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 → 2Sˆ1 × 2Sˆ2 is u.s.c.
Proof. Let (vˆm1 , vˆ
m
2 ) → (vˆ1, vˆ2) ∈ Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 and ˆ¯vm1 ∈ H1(vˆm2 ),m ≥ 1. Since Sˆ1 is
compact, it follows that there exists a limit point, say ˆ¯v1 for {ˆ¯vm1 }. By an abuse of
notation, we write ˆ¯vm1 → ˆ¯v1 in Sˆ1. Now using (A2), Lemma 3.4 and the topology of
Sˆi, i = 1, 2, it follows that
〈b(x, ˆ¯vm1 (θ, x), vˆm2 (θ, x)),∇xψvˆ
m
2
α,1〉+ θr1(x, ˆ¯vm1 (θ, x), vˆm2 (θ, x))
converges weakly in L2loc(0,Θ)× Rd) to
〈b(x, ˆ¯v1(θ, x), vˆ2(θ, x)),∇xψvˆ2α,1〉+ θr1(x, ˆ¯v1(θ, x), vˆ2(θ, x)).
Therefore by Banach-Saks theorem any sequence of convex combination of the former
converges strongly in L2loc(0,Θ)×Rd) to the latter. Hence along a suitable subsequence
(3.19) lim
m→∞
F (x, ˆ¯vm1 (θ, x), vˆ
m
2 (θ, x)) = F (x, ˆ¯v1(θ, x), vˆ2(θ, x)), a.e. in θ, x.
(In above we denote the convex combination coming from the Banach-Saks theorem
by F (x, ˆ¯vm1 (θ, x), vˆ
m
2 (θ, x)) itself by an abuse of notation.) Now fix ˆ˜v1 ∈ Sˆ1 and use
analogous arguments above to conclude that
(3.20) lim
m→∞
F (x, ˆ˜v1(θ, x), vˆ
m
2 (θ, x)) = F (x, ˆ˜v1(θ, x), vˆ2(θ, x)), a.e. in θ, x.
Since ˆ¯vm1 ∈ H1(vˆm2 ), we have
F (x, ˆ˜v1(θ, x), vˆ
m
2 (θ, x)) ≥ F (x, ˆ¯vm1 (θ, x), vˆm2 (θ, x)), m ≥ 1.
Hence from (3.19) and (3.20), we obtain
F (x, ˆ˜v1(θ, x), vˆ2(θ, x)) ≥ F (x, ˆ¯v1(θ, x), vˆ2(θ, x)), ˆ˜v1 ∈ Sˆ1.
Hence ˆ¯v1 ∈ H1(vˆ2). By a symmetric argument, one can show that for ˆ¯vm2 ∈ H2(vˆm1 )
and any limit point ˆ¯v2 of {ˆ¯vm2 }, we have ˆ¯v2 ∈ H2(vˆ1). This proves that the map is
u.s.c.
Theorem 3.6. Assume (A1) and (A2). Then there exists an α-discounted Nash
equilibrium in Sˆ1 × Sˆ2.
Proof. From Lemma 3.5 and Fan’s fixed point theorem [16], there exists a fixed
point (vˆ∗1 , vˆ
∗
2) ∈ Sˆ1 × Sˆ2, for the map (vˆ1, vˆ2) 7→ H(vˆ1, vˆ2) from Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 → 2Sˆ1 × 2Sˆ2 ,
i.e.,
(vˆ∗1 , vˆ
∗
2) ∈ H(vˆ∗1 , vˆ∗2).
This implies that (ψ
vˆ∗2
α,1, ψ
vˆ∗1
α,2) satisfies
αθ
∂ψ
vˆ∗2
α,1
∂θ
= inf
v1∈V1
[
〈b(x, v1, vˆ∗2(θ, x)),∇xψvˆ
∗
2
α,1〉+ θr1(x, v1, vˆ∗2(θ, x))ψvˆ
∗
2
α,1
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψvˆ
∗
2
α,1)
= 〈b(x, vˆ∗1(θ, x), vˆ∗2(θ, x)),∇xψvˆ
∗
2
α,1〉+ θr1(x, vˆ∗1(θ, x), vˆ∗2 (θ, x))ψvˆ
∗
2
α,1
]
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+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψvˆ
∗
2
α,1),
ψ
vˆ∗2
α,1(0, x) = 1, θ ∈ (0, Θ), x ∈ Rd(3.21)
αθ
∂ψ
vˆ∗1
α,2
∂θ
= inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, vˆ∗1(θ, x), v2),∇xψvˆ
∗
1
α,2〉+ θr2(x, vˆ∗1(θ, x), v2)ψvˆ
∗
1
α,2
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψvˆ
∗
1
α,2)
= 〈b(x, vˆ∗1(θ, x), vˆ∗2(θ, x)),∇xψvˆ
∗
1
α,2〉+ θr2(x, vˆ∗1θ, (x), vˆ∗2 (θ, x)ψvˆ
∗
1
α,2
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψvˆ
∗
1
α,2),
ψ
vˆ∗1
α,2(0, x) = 1, θ ∈ (0, Θ), x ∈ Rd.
Now using the representation of the solutions to the p.d.e.s from Theorem 3.2, it
follows that
ψ
vˆ∗2
α,1(θ, x) = inf
v1∈M1
J
v1,vˆ
∗
2
α,1 (θ, x)
= J
vˆ∗1 ,vˆ
∗
2
α,1 (θ, x),
ψ
vˆ∗1
α,2(θ, x) = inf
v2∈M2
J
vˆ∗1 ,v2
α,2 (θ, x)
= J
vˆ∗1 ,vˆ
∗
2
α,2 (θ, x).
Thus, we obtain
J
v1,vˆ
∗
2
α,1 (θ, x) ≥ J vˆ
∗
1 ,vˆ
∗
2
α,1 (θ, x), ∀ v1 ∈M1,
J
vˆ∗1 ,v2
α,2 (θ, x) ≥ J vˆ
∗
1 ,vˆ
∗
2
α,2 (θ, x), ∀ v2 ∈M2.
This proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium which is a pair of eventually stationary
Markov strategies.
4. Analysis of Ergodic Cost Criterion. In this section, we study the ergodic
cost criterion for the risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games. Since cost criterion
is dependent on the limiting behavior of the state dynamics, it is quite natural to
assume certain stable behavior of the dynamics. We assume the following Lyapunov
type stability condition:
(A3) There exists constants δ > 0, c > 0, a compact set C of Rd and W ∈ C2(Rd)
such that
W ≥ 1
LW (x, v1, v2) ≤ −2δW (x) + cIC(x), ∀ x ∈ Rd, v1 ∈ V1, v2 ∈ V2,
where for x ∈ Rd, v1 ∈ V1, v2 ∈ V2, ϕ ∈ C2(Rd),
(4.1) Lϕ(x, v1, v2) = 〈b(x, v1, v2),∇xϕ(x)〉 + 1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xϕ(x)).
We also assume the following technical assumption.
(A4) (Small cost condition)
θ‖rk‖∞ ≤ δ, k = 1, 2, θ ∈ (0,Θ).
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Now we establish some properties of the controlled diffusion (2.1) needed later. Set
(4.2) C0 = {x ∈ Rd|W (x) > 1 + c
δ
}.
Note that C0 is the complement of a compact set in R
d.
Lemma 4.1. Assume (A1) and (A3). Let X be the process (2.1) corresponding
to (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2. Then for each y ∈ C0 and r > 0 such that B(y, r) ⊆ C0, we
have
Ev1,v2x [e
δτry ] ≤ W (x), x ∈ Rd,
where τry = inf{t ≥ 0|X(t) ∈ B(y, r)}.
Proof. Fix x ∈ Rd and R > 0 large. Let
τR = inf{t ≥ 0|‖X(t)‖ ≥ R}.
Using Itoˆ-Dynkin formula, we obtain
Ev1,v2x
[
eδ(τ
r
y∧τR)W (X(τry ∧ τR))
]
= Ev1,v2x
[ ∫ τry∧τR
0
eδs[LW (X(s), v1(s,X(s)), v2(s,X(s)))
+δW (X(s))]ds
]
+W (x)
≤ (−1 + c
δ
)Ev1,v2x
[
eδ(τ
r
y∧τR)
]
+W (x)
≤ c
δ
Ev1,v2x
[
eδτ
r
y
]
.
Now by letting R→∞, using Fatou’s lemma, we obtain
Ev1,v2x
[
eδτ
r
xW (X(τry ))
]
≤ c
δ
Ev1,v2x
[
eδτ
r
y
]
+W (x).
Since B(y, r) ⊆ C0, we haveW ≥ 1+ cδ on B(y, r). The desired estimate then follows.
The following lemma follows by an application of Itoˆ-Dynkin formula applied to
eθ
∫
t
0
rk(X(s),v1(s,X(s)),v2(s,X(s)))dsW (X(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ τR ∧ T and using (A4).
Lemma 4.2. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Let X be the process (2.1) corre-
sponding to (v1, v2) ∈M1 ×M2. Then for k = 1, 2, we have
Ev1,v2x
[
eθ
∫
T
0
rk(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dtW (X(T ))
]
≤ [W (x) + cT ]Ev1,v2x
[
eθ
∫
T
0
rk(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
]
, x ∈ Rd, T > 0.
We now establish the following result which plays a crucial role in what follows.
Theorem 4.3. Assume (A1) and (A2). There exists (vˆ∗1,α, vˆ
∗
2,α) ∈ Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 such
that (ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 , ψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 ) satisfies
αθ
∂ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1
∂θ
= inf
v1∈V1
[
〈b(x, v1, vˆ∗2,α(θ, x)),∇xψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 〉+ θr1(x, v1, vˆ∗2,α(θ, x))ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1
]
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+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 )
= 〈b(x, vˆ∗1,α(θ, x), vˆ∗2,α(θ, x)),∇xψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 〉+ θr1(x, vˆ∗1,α(θ, x), vˆ∗2,α(θ, x))ψ
v∗2,α
α,1
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 ),
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (0, x) = 1, θ ∈ (0, Θ), x ∈ Rd,
αθ
∂ψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2
∂θ
= inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, vˆ∗1(θ, x), v2),∇xψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 〉+ θr2(x, vˆ∗1,α(θ, x), v2)ψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 )
= 〈b(x, vˆ∗1,α(θ, x), vˆ∗2,α(θ, x)),∇xψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 〉+ θr2(x, vˆ∗1,αθ, (x), vˆ∗2,α(θ, x)ψ
v∗1,α
α,2
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 ),
ψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 (0, x) = 1, θ ∈ (0, Θ), x ∈ Rd.
Moreover, the following estimates holds:
1
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x)
∂ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x)
∂θ
≤ θ‖r1‖∞
α
,(4.3)
1
ψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 (θ, x)
∂ψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 (θ, x)
∂θ
≤ θ‖r2‖∞
α
,
for all α > 0, θ ∈ (0, Θ), x ∈ Rd.
Proof. The first part of the proof follows from Theorem 3.6. Using Theorem 3.2
(ii), we have
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x) = inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,vˆ
∗
2,α
x
[
eθ
∫∞
0
e−αtr1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),vˆ
∗
2,α(θe
−αt,X(t)))dt
]
.
Now using the envelope theorem, see [21], we have
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x)
∂θ
= E
v∗1 ,vˆ
∗
2,α
x
[
θ
∫ ∞
0
e−αtr1(X(t), v
∗
1(t,X(t)), vˆ
∗
2,α(θe
−αt, X(t)))dt
×eθ
∫∞
0
e−αtr1(X(t),v
∗
1(t,X(t)),vˆ
∗
2,α(θe
−αt,X(t)))dt
]
≤ θ‖r1‖∞
α
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x),
where v∗1 is a minimizer for J
v1,v
∗
2,α(θ, x) over v1 ∈ M1. This completes the proof of
first estimate. The proof of the second estimate is symmetric.
Fix x0 ∈ C0 and set
(4.4) ψ¯
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x) =
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x)
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x0)
, ψ¯
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 (θ, x) =
ψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 (θ, x)
ψ
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 (θ, x0)
, x ∈ Rd.
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Lemma 4.4. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Then
ψ¯
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x) ≤W (x)
ψ¯
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 (θ, x) ≤W (x), x ∈ Rd.
Proof. Using Itoˆ-Dynkin formula it is easy to see that for each v1 ∈ M1, and
r > 0 small enough, we have
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x) ≤ E
v1,vˆ
∗
2,α
x
[
eθ
∫ τrx0
0 e
−αtr1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),vˆ
∗
2,α(θe
−αt,X(t)))dtψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θe
−ατrx0 , X(τrx0))
]
≤ sup
y∈∂B(x0,r)
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, y)E
v1,vˆ
∗
2,α
x
[
eθ
∫ τrx0
0 e
−αtr1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),vˆ
∗
2,α(θe
−αt,X(t)))dt
]
≤ sup
y∈∂B(x0,r)
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, y)E
v1,vˆ
∗
2,α
x
[
eδτ
r
x0
]
.
The second inequality follows from the fact that θ 7→ ψv
∗
2,α
α,1 (θ, x) is non-decreasing in
θ for each fixed x. Now using Lemma 4.1, we obtain
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x) ≤ sup
y∈∂B(x0,r)
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, y)W (x).
Now by letting r ↓ 0, we obtain
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x) ≤ ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x0)W (x).
Hence the first estimate follows. The proof of the second estimate is similar.
Lemma 4.5. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Then we have the following
ψ¯
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x) ≥
1
W (x0)
,
ψ¯
vˆ∗1,α
α,2 (θ, x) ≥
1
W (x0)
, x ∈ C0.
Proof. For x ∈ C0, using Itoˆ-Dynkin formula, it follows that for each v1 ∈ M1,
and r > 0 small enough
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x0) ≤ E
v1,vˆ
∗
2,α
x0
[
eθ
∫ τrx
0 e
−αtr1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),vˆ
∗
2,α(θe
−αt,X(t)))dtψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θe
−ατrx , X(τrx))
]
≤ sup
y∈∂B(x,r)
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, y)E
v1,vˆ
∗
2,α
x0
[
eθ
∫ τrx
0 e
−αtr1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),vˆ
∗
2,α(θe
−αt,X(t)))dt
]
.
Hence
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x0)
sup
y∈∂B(x,r)
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, y)
≤ Ev1,vˆ
∗
2,α
x0
[
eθ
∫ τrx
0 e
−αtr1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),vˆ
∗
2,α(θe
−αt,X(t)))dt
]
≤ Ev1,vˆ
∗
2,α
x0 [e
θ‖r1‖∞τ
r
x ]
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≤W (x0).
The last inequality follows using Lemma 4.1 and the fact that x ∈ C0. Now by letting
r ↓ 0, the first estimate follows. The proof of the second lower bound follows by a
symmetric argument.
Theorem 4.6. Assume (A1)-(A4). For each θ ∈ (0,Θ), there exists (v∗1 , v∗2) ∈
S1 × S2 and (ρ1, ψ1), (ρ2, ψ2) ∈ R×W 2,ploc (Rd) ∩O(W ) satisfying
θρ1ψ1 = inf
v1∈V1
[
〈b(x, v1, v∗2(x)),∇xψ1〉+ θr1(x, v1, v∗2(x))ψ1
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ1)
= 〈b(x, v∗1(x), v∗2(x)),∇xψ1〉+ θr1(x, v∗1(x), v∗2(x))ψ1
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ1),
ψ1(x0) = 1, x ∈ Rd,
θρ2ψ2 = inf
v2∈V2
[
〈b(x, v∗1(x), v2),∇xψ2〉+ θr2(x, v∗1(x), v2)ψ2
]
(4.5)
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ2)
= 〈b(x, v∗1(x), v∗2(x)),∇xψ2〉+ θr2(x, v∗1(x), v∗2(x))ψ1
]
+
1
2
trace(a(x)∇2xψ2),
ψ2(x0) = 1, x ∈ Rd.
Proof. From Theorem 4.3, it follows that ψ¯
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 ∈ W 1,2,ploc ((0,Θ) × Rd), p ≥ d +
1, α > 0, satisfies the p.d.e.
(4.6) ηα(θ, x)ψ¯
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 = inf
v1∈V1
[
Lψ¯vˆ
∗
2,α
α,1 (x, v1, vˆ
∗
2,α(θ, x)) + θr1(x, v1, vˆ
∗
2,α(x))ψ¯
vˆ∗2,α
α,1
]
,
where
(4.7) ηα(θ, x) = αθ
1
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1
∂ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1
∂θ
(θ, x).
From the estimates in Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 4.4, it follows that the l.h.s. of (4.6) is
locally uniformly bounded in α > 0. Hence by freezing the l.h.s., using the arguments
in [[12], p.158], it follows that
(4.8) ‖ψ¯vˆ
∗
2,α
α,1 ‖2,p;BR ≤ K,
where K > 0 is a constant independent of α > 0. Also note that
(4.9)
∂ψ¯
vˆ∗2,α
α,1
∂θ
(θ, x) = ψ¯
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x)
[ 1
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x)
∂ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1
∂θ
(θ, x) − 1
ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1 (θ, x0)
∂ψ
vˆ∗2,α
α,1
∂θ
(θ, x0)
]
.
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Now combining the estimates in Theorem 4.3, Lemma 4.4, (4.8) and the identity (4.9),
it follows that
(4.10) ‖ψ¯vˆ
∗
2,α
α,1 ‖1,2,p;(0,Θ)×BR ≤ K,
where K > 0 is a constant independent of α > 0. Hence {ψ¯vˆ
∗
2,α
α,1 |α > 0} is weakly
compact in W 1,2,p((0,Θ)×BR), R > 0, p ≥ d+ 1.
Now by a diagonalization argument, there exists ψ1 ∈ W 1,2,ploc ((0,Θ)×Rd), p ≥ d+1
and a subsequence αn ↓ 0 such that
(4.11) ψ¯
vˆ∗2,αn
αn,1
→ ψ1 weakly in W 1,2,p((0,Θ)×BR), ∀ R > 0.
By closely mimicking the arguments in [11], it follows that
(4.12) ηαn → ρ1(θ) weakly in L∞((0,Θ)× Rd).
Since Sˆ1×Sˆ2 is compact, it follows that there exists (v∗1 , v∗2) ∈ Sˆ1×Sˆ2 such that along
a subsequence (by an abuse of notation αn itself) (vˆ
∗
αn,1, vˆ
∗
αn,2)→ (v∗1 , v∗2) in Sˆ1× Sˆ2.
Now by letting αn ↓ 0 in (4.6), it follows that (ρ1, ψ1) ∈ R×W 1,2,ploc ((0,Θ)× Rd) is a
solution to the first part of the system of p.d.e.s in (4.5). Clearly (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ S1 × S2.
From Lemma 4.4, it follows that ψ1 ∈ O(W ). The proof for the second part of the
p.d.e. is similar.
To proceed further we assume that:
(A5) There exists β > 1 and an inf compact h : Rd → [0, ∞) such that
LW β(x, v1, v2) ≤ −h(x) + cˆICˆ , ∀ x ∈ Rd, v1 ∈ V1, v2 ∈ V2,
where cˆ > 0 and Cˆ is a compact subset of Rd.
It is not difficult to see that if W is a polynomial in x, then (A3) implies (A5),
in particular, if W (x) = xQx⊥ for some positive definite matrix Q, then (A5) follows
from (A3).
Finally we prove the following result.
Theorem 4.7. Assume (A1)-(A5). The stationary Markov strategies (v∗1 , v
∗
2)
given in Theorem 4.6 is a Nash equilibrium and (ρ1, ρ2) is the corresponding Nash
values.
Proof. Let X be the process (2.1) corresponding to (v1, v
∗
2), v1 ∈M1 with initial
condition x. Now using Itoˆ-Dynkin formula we obtain
E
v1,v
∗
2
x
[
eθ
∫ T∧τR
0 (r1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v
∗
2 (X(t)))−ρ1)dtψ1(X(T ∧ τR))
]
= E
v1,v
∗
2
x
[ ∫ T∧τR
0
eθ
∫
t
0
(r1(X(s),v1(s,X(s)),v
∗
2(X(s)))−ρ1)ds[Lψ1(X(t), v1(t,X(t)), v∗2(X(t)))
+ θ(r1(X(t), v1(t,X(t)), v
∗
2(X(t)))− ρ1)ψ1(X(t))dt
]
+ ψ1(x)
≥ ψ1(x).
Hence
ψ1(x) ≤ Ev1,v
∗
2
x
[
eθ
∫ T∧τR
0 (r1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v
∗
2(X(t)))−ρ1)dtW (X(T ∧ τR))
]
≤ Ev1,v
∗
2
x
[
eθ
∫ T∧τR
0 (r1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v
∗
2(X(t)))−ρ1)dtW (X(T ∧ τR))I{T ≤ τR}
]
(4.13)
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+eθ(‖r1‖∞−ρ1)TE
v1,v
∗
2
x
[
W (X(T ∧ τR))I{T > τR}
]
.
Now using (A5), we get
E
v1,v
∗
2
x
[
W (X(T ∧ τR))I{T > τR}
]
≤
[
E
v1,v
∗
2
x
[
W β(X(T ∧ τR))
]] 1
β
[
P
v1,v
∗
2
x (T > τR)
]1− 1
β
≤ (W β(x) + cˆT ) 1β
[
P
v1,v
∗
2
x (T > τR)
]1− 1
β
,
where β > 1 as in (A5) and the second inequality follows by (A5) by an application
of Itoˆ-Dynkin formula to W β(X(t)). Hence
(4.14) lim
R→∞
E
[
W (X(T ∧ τR))I{T > τR}
]
= 0.
From (4.13), (4.14) and Lemma 4.2, we get
ψ1(x) ≤ Ev1,v
∗
2
x
[
eθ
∫
T
0
(r1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v
∗
2(X(t)))−ρ1)dtW (X(T ))
]
≤ e−θρ1T (W (x) + cT )Ev1,v
∗
2
x
[
eθ
∫
T
0
r1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v
∗
2 (X(t)))dt
]
.(4.15)
Now by taking logarithm in (4.15), then divide by θT and by letting T →∞ we get
ρ1 ≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
θT
logE
v1,v
∗
2
x
[
eθ
∫
T
0
r1(X(t),v1(t,X(t)),v
∗
2 (X(t)))dt
]
.
i.e.,
(4.16) ρ1 ≤ inf
v1∈M1
ρ
v1,v
∗
2
1 (θ, x).
Now let X denote the process (2.1) corresponding to (v∗1 , v
∗
2) with initial condition x.
Now using Itoˆ-Dynkin formula as above we get
ψ1(x) = E
v∗1 ,v
∗
2
x
[
eθ
∫ T∧τR
0 (r1(X(t),v
∗
1 (X(t)),v
∗
2(X(t)))−ρ1)dtψ1(X(T ∧ τR))
]
≥ kEv∗1 ,v∗2x
[
eθ
∫ T∧τR
0 (r1(X(t),v
∗
1 (X(t)),v
∗
2(X(t)))−ρ1)dt
]
,
where
k = min
{
min
y∈Cc0
ψ1(y),
1
W (x0)
}
> 0.
Using Fatou’s lemma, we obtain
ψ1(x) ≥ kEv
∗
1 ,v
∗
2
x
[
eθ
∫
T
0
(r1(X(t),v
∗
1(X(t)),v
∗
2 (X(t)))−ρ1)dt
]
.
Hence it follows that
ρ1 ≥ lim sup
T→∞
1
θT
logE
v∗1 ,v
∗
2
x
[
eθ
∫
T
0
r1(X(t),v
∗
1 (X(t)),v
∗
2 (X(t)))dt
]
.
i.e.
(4.17) ρ1 ≥ ρv
∗
1 ,v
∗
2 (θ, x), x ∈ Rd.
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Combining (4.16) and (4.17) we get
ρ1 = ρ
v∗1 ,v
∗
2
1 (θ, x) ≤ ρv1,v
∗
2
1 (θ, x) ∀ v1 ∈M1, x ∈ Rd.
A symmetric argument implies
ρ2 = ρ
v∗1 ,v
∗
2
2 (θ, x) ≤ ρv
∗
1 ,v2
2 (θ, x) ∀ v2 ∈M2, x ∈ Rd.
This completes the proof.
5. Conclusion. In this paper we have established the existence of a pair of
Nash equilibrium strategies for risk sensitive stochastic games for diffusion process
for two types of cost criteria. First we have established the the existence of a pair of
Nash equilibrium strategies for α-discounted cost criterion in the class of eventually
stationary Markov strategies under (A1) and (A2). For ergodic cost criterion we have
proved the the existence of a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies under a Lyapunov
type stability assumption and a small cost condition and (A1), (A2). Both cases (A2)
plays a crucial role in our analysis. It will be interesting to study the same problem
without (A2). Finally we have chosen the same risk-sensitive parameter θ for both
players for the sake of notational simplicity. The extension to the case when different
players choose different risk-sensitive parameters would be routine. In fact our analysis
extends to the case where player 1 is risk-averse and selects a risk-aversion parameter
θ1 > 0 where as player 2 is risk-seeking and chooses a risk seeking parameter θ2 < 0.
Finally we conclude with a remark on the zero-sum case. For the zero-sum case
r¯1(x, u1, u2) + r¯2(x, u1, u2) = 0
for all x ∈ Rd, u1 ∈ U1, u2 ∈ U2. This does not imply that the sum of the risk-
sensitive discounted (or ergodic) costs is zero. This is due to the multiplicative nature
of the evaluation criterion. Thus in the zero-sum case, if we set
r1 = −r2 = r,
then for θ > 0, player 1 is risk-averse whereas player 2 is risk-seeking. Thus the zero-
sum case has to be necessarily studied via Nash equilibria. The standard concepts
like values, saddle-point equilibria etc will not be meaningful in the multiplicative cost
criterion. In [4], however a particular type of (non-standard) zero-sum risk-sensitive
stochastic differential game has been studied which is not a special case of non-zero
sum case studied in this paper. In [4] it is assumed that r1 = r2 = r. Player 1 tries
to minimizes his risk-sensitive discounted (or ergodic) cost whereas player 2 tries to
maximize the same. In this scenario, the notation of value, saddle-point equilibria etc
make sense which have been analyzed through appropriate Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs
(HJI) equations in [4].
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